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Abstract
There is little research on the gender variation in the crime market. We document
a gender gap in criminal activities, based on property crimes, using data from the U.S.
National Incident Based Reporting System from 1995 to 2015. We show that there is a
gender participation gap, with only 30 percent of the crimes being committed by females.
We try to explain the gender participation gap by focusing on incentives to commit crime,
such as criminal earnings and probability of arrest. We show that on average females earn
13 percent less than males while they face a 9 percent lower likelihood of arrest. We find
that males respond more to changes in illegal earnings, with an elasticity of 0.36, while
females are less responsive with an elasticity of 0.23. Both genders respond equally to
changes in the probability of arrest, with an elasticity around -0.14. Using a Blinder-
Oaxaca type decomposition technique, we find that differences in incentives explain about
8 percent of the gender participation gap, while differences in responsiveness to changes in
incentives, especially illegal earnings, explain about 56 percent of the gap. The fact that
females behave differently than males has implications for the heterogeneity in response
to crime control policies.
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1 Introduction
In the past years there has been considerable attention given to the gender gaps in wages
and employment. Yet, almost no notice has been given to the gender gap in an illegal setting
and none on the gender gap in criminal earnings. Most research in the economics of crime
has focused on male perpetrators (Levitt & Miles, 2007; Freeman, 1999), with the implicit
assumptions that female crime is so little that it is of no consequences or that policy impli-
cations have external validity across genders. Yet, female crime has been growing in the last
decades, as we show with the percentage share of women who are incarcerated in Figure 1,
and it is not possible anymore to assume it away. One of the main reason for which there
is a little research on crime is the data limitation on demographic details about the criminal
perpetrators.
In this article we want to fill the “gap” in research on the gender crime gap. In the
economic model of crime criminal participation is intrinsically connected with the possible
illegal earnings and detection probability. We use detailed matched offense-arrest data on
property (including white-collar crimes) from the the U.S. National Incident Based Reporting
System (NIBRS) for the period 1995-2015. These data offer the unique opportunity to link
the participation decision to the likelihood of arrest and the illegal earnings. We match the
NIBRS data to population statistics and compute cohort specific crime rates1, where cohorts
are defined based on interval of age, race, gender and county allowing us to explore the
gender participation decisions in crime in light of the associated illegal earnings and arrest
probabilities.
We start off by quantifying the gaps in crime for participation, illegal earnings and arrest
probability. Only around 30 percent of the crimes are committed by women. We find that
females earn 7 percent less than males and face a similar probability of arrest. When we
explore the heterogeneity with respect to crime type we find that females participate most in
shoplifting. In the absence of this crime, we observe a more severe earnings gap of 13 percent
and a 9 percent lower probability of arrest for females. We interpret this as possible evidence
that females sort into shoplifting as a way to obtain higher criminal earnings, yet they suffer
from the higher detection and arrest rate associated with this particular crime.
In our second set of results we try to relate the participation rates to earnings and ar-
rest probabilities. First, we assume that criminals rationally form their expectations on the
criminal incentives2 based past experience. This mechanism is similar to the one described in
Lochner (2007). Then we use these predicted values to see how female and male crime rates
respond to changes in expected illegal earnings and in the probability of arrest, allowing us
to identify gender-specific elasticities.
We find strong evidence that past incentives predicted future ones, generating a strong
“first stage.” As for the responsiveness, we find that males have a higher elasticity of illegal
earnings of 0.36 compared to 0.23 for females. Both genders have a similar elasticity of
arrest, predicting that one percent increase in the probability of arrest leads to a 0.14 percent
decrease in crimes committed. By exploiting a partial Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition we try
to measure how much of the participation decision is due to different criminal incentives and
different elasticities. We find that if females were more “manly” with respect to incentives
1Henceforth, we will refer to these crime rates as participation rates.
2In the standard economic model of crime both higher earnings and a lower arrest probability can persuade
a criminal to commit a crime. Therefore, we will refer to these two variables as criminal incentives. The
probability of arrest deters criminals, generating a negative incentive rather than a positive one. In our model,
we allow males and females to respond differently to these incentives.
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and responsiveness to them this would reduce the participation gap by 64 percent.
The main implication of our findings concerns the external validity of previous studies that
have been conducted only on a sample of male offenders. We show that males and females
respond differently to incentives.
Crucially, our elasticities with respect to the probability of arrest could be compared to
previous literature. In a recent review of the literature, Chalfin & McCrary (2017) show that
estimated elasticities with respect to an increase in the police manpower are in the range of
-10 to -20 percent. Our estimates fall well within this range and are significant at conventional
levels.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies with US data with estimated elasticities
with respect to illegal earnings to which we can compare our estimates. Our elasticities are
roughly in the range 25-40 percent as estimated by Draca et al. (n.d.) on UK data. Our
estimates imply that policies that aim to reduce the illegal earnings of criminals would impact
males more than females.
Our research is of interest to policy makers that want to decrease crime. We provide ev-
idence for the heterogeneity in response between genders to policies that alter the incentives
to engage in crime. More specifically, if the policy maker wants to discourage males to partic-
ipate in crime, this would be most effective with policies that decrease the value of potential
earnings. Examples for such policies are black market regulation, where pawn shops could be
placed under additional surveillance or additional security for higher value items (see D’Este,
2014).
Related Literature. We contribute to several strands in the literature. Most prominently, in
the Handbook of Labour Economics, Freeman (1999) acknowledges the gap in studies about
the gender variation in crime and underlines that there are no studies by economists that
analyze the large differences in the participation of males and females. Since then there has
been scant response to this apparent gap and we are one of the first to fully investigate this
research question.
On one hand, there are a few papers that look at the criminal market in isolation. The
earliest economic study on female criminals, Bartel (1979), investigates the determinants of
female participation in crime through an Ehrlich type model of time division. The author finds
that probabilities of conviction and arrest have a deterrent effect on females in some property
crimes. Our results are in line with her findings. Gavrilova (2017) investigates the incentives
for assortative matching in a criminal pair and finds that females are likely discriminated
against when matching with males.
On the other hand, there is a small literature that tries to identify the participation
decision by looking at shifts in the opportunity cost of crime. Recently, Corman et al. (2014)
find that the 1996 “welfare reform” in the U.S., aimed at incentivizing female work, led to a
decrease in female arrests for serious property crimes by 4.4−4.9%. Cano-Urbina et al. (n.d.)
look at the effect of education on female crime. They find that one more year of school for
females reduces, on average, property and violent crimes by 50%, while they do not find any
effect on white collar crime. They argue that the effect of education on crime for females is
probably due to changes in marital opportunities rather than labor market opportunities. In
our paper we control for employment opportunities and wage that represent the opportunity
costs of being involved in criminal activities.
A recent study by Beatton et al. (n.d.) examines the convergence of the gender crime
gap in Australia. They find gaps that are in line with the ones we find in the US context.
They show that over the course of the last 20 years these gaps have contracted by 30 percent.
In descriptive evidence here we show that over almost the same period of time the US crime
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gap has contracted by 28 percent, again a very similar number. Overall, female participation
in crime seems to be increasing around the world.
By focusing our analysis on the illegal earnings of criminals we are contributing to the
understanding of “the most understudied element of crime” (Draca & Machin, 2015). Recent
literature has only attempted to approximate the illegal earnings of criminals, such as Draca
et al. (n.d.), while we have more precise information on the value of the property stolen.
Finally, we use NIBRS data on property offenses that include white collar crimes, a quite
neglected and understudied typology of crimes in the literature.
2 Descriptives
2.1 Data
For our analysis we use the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). This dataset
contains records on the universe of crime incidents for a given year for a given law-enforcement
agency in the United States. The data are not representative for the United States as a whole,
as many agencies do not submit reports and the expansion of data collection is on-going. A
typical observation is a coded report about a criminal incident. It contains the number of
perpetrators, their demographic characteristics and crime codes. We match the report data to
the arrest data, in order to see whether a perpetrator was arrested. We observe both arrested
and non-arrested criminals. Criminal earnings are recorded regardless of whether there was
an arrest.
We limit our analysis to property crimes (including white collar crimes). We do this for
two reasons. First, property crimes are more common than other crimes. The violent crime
rate over the period 2016 is 386 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, while the property crime rate
is 2,451 crimes. White collar crimes themselves seem to be even more prevalent, according to
survey evidence from Huff et al. (2010). Second, for property and white collar crimes we can
observe a relevant incentive such as the illegal earnings, while for violent crimes the incentives
are difficult to quantify.
In Table 1 we detail the types of crimes that we analyze. Once we select these crime
incidents we have 45 million observations on criminals over the period 1995 to 2015. We
select individuals between 15-44 years of age, of black or white race. This selection is mainly
guided by the availability of control variables, as we want to approximate the opportunity
cost of crime in the best way we can. In addition, we exclude the two other races Asian and
Native American that are provided in the data, because they comprise a too small fraction (3
percent each in the dataset).
In order to understand the criminal participation decision we define “pseudo-individuals”
and construct a synthetic panel (see Deaton, 1985). We aggregate crimes within “cohorts” and
divide by the corresponding population, thus getting a measure of crime rates and variation
in the participation decision. The resulting unbalanced panel is treated as pseudo-individuals
that can be tracked over time. The cohorts are defined based on: interval of age (15-24, 25-34
and 35-443), race (black and white), gender (male, female), and county. The panel spans over
a period of 20 years.
We take data on population (by age, gender, race, year, and county) from the Wide-
ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER). Data on average wages and
3Data on the general population at county level are just available until the age of 44 and we know that 75
percent of the crimes are committed by perpetrators from the selected age groups.
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employment rates (by age, gender, race, decade, and state) are taken from the CENSUS
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA).
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
Table 2 shows the summary statistics by gender. Across cohorts we observe that there are on
average 20 females committing crimes versus 39 males. These numbers correspond to crime
rates of 713 per 100,000 inhabitants for males and 331 per 100,000 inhabitants for females.
Both of these crime rates are below conventional levels of property crime rates in the US, as
cited above for 2016 the crime rate was 2,451. Likely the difference comes from the fact that
in our sample we keep offenders whose demographic characteristics were well observed, in a
certain age group, while in the official statistics reports are aggregated for all types of offend-
ers, both unknown and observed. Females have a smaller likelihood of arrest of 35 percent
versus 36 percent for males. We also show that females have less earnings, at $1724 versus
$1928 for males.
In Figure 2 we show how these statistics have evolved over time. We observe that the fe-
male/male ratio in criminal participation increased over the 20 year sample period. Concur-
rently with this increase in female participation, we observe that women, on average, have
decreased their criminal earnings and slightly increased their probability of arrest with respect
to men.
In Figure 3 we present the gender participation gap as a function of the earnings gap (top
row) and the arrest gap (bottom row) for the different crime types. In panel (a) we show that
when females’ relative earnings increase, their participation in criminal activities decreases
but this relationship seems to be driven by shoplifting. Panel (b) shows that the relationship
becomes positive, as one would expect if criminals respond to incentives, when shoplifting is
excluded. In panel (c) we show that females participate more in criminal activities when their
relative likelihood of arrest is lower, which is again coherent with economic theory. A shown
in panel (d), shoplifting seems to be in line with the overall trend.
Since behind the averages in Figure 2 there might be significant hidden heterogeneity, in
Figure 4 we compare the densities of earnings and arrest probability for males and females.
We present earnings on the top row and arrest probability on the bottom row. The first
column shows the overall data, while the second column excludes shoplifting. In panel (a) we
observe that female earnings are bimodal, while male ones are more to the right in location.
In panel(b) when excluding shoplifting the two distributions are more similar and comparable.
However, the male distribution still remains to the right of the female, mirroring the averages
from Table 2 and showing that males earn more than females. In panel (c) we observe the
density of the probability of arrest for males and females and we notice the sharp spike in
the right part of the density of females. In panel (d) we show that this spike is driven by
shoplifting, and as we exclude it we again arrive at more comparable distributions. The fact
that shoplifting can drive the spike in panel (c) of Figure 4 could be due to the crime being
reported only if an arrest takes place. Since this would bias the elasticity of crime with respect
to the probability of arrest, we exclude shoplifting in the main analysis (but include it in the
robustness checks).
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3 Model of Crime
3.1 Theory
Following Becker (1968), we assume that an individual compares the expected utility of com-
mitting a crime with the expected utility of not committing a crime. The expected benefits
from a crime are the illegal earnings. The expected cost is the sanction length. Both benefits
and costs hinge on the realization of the probability of detection and arrest. The expected
utility of not committing the crime is based on the opportunity cost of crime: being engaged
in the legal labor market. We introduce in the model a gender-specific component, in order
to test for difference between genders in the subsequent sections of this paper.
Therefore, an individual from gender g, g ∈ {m, f}, decides to be involved in a criminal
activity if a gender-specific function fg() of costs and benefits is larger than an individual
idiosyncratic error Υg. Υg can measure any unobserved determinants of crime such as so-
ciocultural and family factors. By allowing the function to be gender-specific we allow each
gender to respond differently to their own expectations:
fg(E(Yg), E(Pg), E(Wg), E(Lg), E(Jg)) > Υg , (1)
We take the expectation of the criminal over variables like illegal earnings (denoted by
Y ), probability of arrest (P ), legal wage (W ), employment (L) and sanctions (J). In order to
arrive to a estimable equation, we log-linearize the function f() with respect to the variables
in the model and note that when we sum over all the cases, in which fg() > Υg, delivers the
crime rate Cg:
cg = β
1
gyg + β
2
gpg + β
3
gwg + β
4
g lg + β
5
gjg + εg (2)
where lower case letter denote logged quantities. Assuming a specific functional form
for f(·) allows us to gauge some intuition about the importance of the different pieces. If
criminals have constant relative risk aversion utility functions, the different factors that enter
the utility function are unrelated to each other, and criminals can either work or engage in
crime, condition (1) becomes:4
fg(·) = Yˆ 1−ρgg /(1− ρg)− PˆgJˆg − (WˆgLˆg)1−ρg/(1− ρg) > Υg. (3)
Log-linearizing and assuming that Υg is uniformly distributed it is easy to show that the
elasticity of crime with respect to criminal earnings is proportional to (1 − ρg), while the
elasticity of crime with respect to the probability of arrest would be the same for males and
females. This would imply that more risk loving criminals are, the more they respond to
changes in the expected illegal earnings.
Using a log-log specification the coefficients measure elasticities. Equation 2 implies that a
gender crime participation gap (cm vs cf ) could be both due to (1) gender-specific differences
in key variables such as illegal earnings yg and (2) over the way criminals respond to such
incentives, for e.g. β1g . The subscript g on the coefficients βg denotes that the effect of the
variable could be different by gender. With the subscript g on the variables we model the
fact that the expectation could be formed over the gender-specific expected values for the
variables. That is, the expectations for males are based on the variables like earnings and
arrest of other males.5
4“Hats” indicate criminals’ perceptions.
5We use the variable g in subscript here in order to describe better the data in the next subsection when
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More formally, we explicitly model the expectations of criminals as a function of the
previous realization of the variables. Lochner (2007) shows with survey data that indeed
criminals form expectations on the probability of arrest by observing realizations in their own
peer group. Similarly, we assume that the expectation over the probability of arrest pg and
earnings yg is formed by observing the peer group within the cohort of criminals. We define
cohorts at the crime type-, gender-, race-, age group- and location level, so that the cohort
captures the peer group and this peer group is significantly homogeneous. This is similar to
Lochner (2007), who also defines a narrow peer group over which the expectations of criminals
are modeled.
3.2 Estimation
In this section we present our empirical methodology. There are two main reasons for the
presence of a participation gap. First, there could be a difference in the incentives that each
gender faces such as probability of arrest or earnings.6 Second, even if the incentives were
the same, maybe the two genders react differently to them. In the next subsection, we show
how we want to describe the differences between the two genders in terms of illegal earnings
and arrest - two of the main incentives in the crime participation decision. Second, we show
how sensitive this participation decision is to changes in incentives of probability of arrest and
illegal earnings.
3.2.1 Incentives
In Section 2 and Figure 3 we document significant differences between males and females in
terms of illegal earnings, arrest and participation. To describe how earnings and arrest vary
with gender and other factors we estimate the specifications of the following type for the
criminal earnings and probability of arrest:
zgit = βD(g = f)git +X
′
gitγ + εgit (4)
where zgit is the dependent variable (either the log illegal earnings or the log arrest rate)
for criminals of gender g, in cohort i and year t. D(g = f) is an indicator function equal to
one when the gender is female. A β = 0 would imply that the dependent variable does not
vary with the gender. X is a vector containing personal-cohort traits like race, age, average
wage and unemployment rate.
We include offense fixed effects in order to account for the effects of different offenses on
the unconditional gap. For example, we expect that a criminal would earn more in auto theft
crimes than in shoplifting and if males specialize in the former, while females specialize in
the latter, this would earn a high unconditional gap. In order to control for county specific
heterogeneity such as police presence in any given year, we include county-year fixed effects.
Furthermore, in some specifications we also includes state-offense fixed effects to control for
differences in sanctions across different states. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the
county level, in order to account for correlation of residuals over time within county.
we define the estimating equations.
6The probability of arrest is a deterrent to crime rather than an “economic” incentive. In the interest of
the following exposition, we will refer to both earnings and arrest probability as incentives, while keeping in
mind that “incentives” is heterogeneous category.
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3.2.2 Responsiveness to Incentives
Once we map the log differences between the two genders in criminal earnings and arrest
probabilities, we turn to the participation decision. Starting from Equation 2 we obtain:
cgit = β
1
gygit + β
2
gpgit +X
′
gitδg + εgit, for g ∈ {m, f}, (5)
where cgit is the log crime rate defined as the number of crimes committed by criminals
in gender g in a given year t by people within a cohort i. The cohort is defined by age group,
race, and county, and the crime rate is divided by the general population in the same cohort.
y is the log of expected illegal earnings, p is the log of the expected probability of arrest.
X is a vector containing sociodemographic variables, specific to the cohort, such as wage,
employment rate, race and age group.
Similar to Equation 4, in some specifications we include county-year fixed effects in order
to control for county specific heterogeneity, such as police presence, in any given year. In
some specifications we include state-offense fixed effects to control for differences in criminal
sanctions across different states. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the county level.
Note that we estimate equation 5 separately for males and females.
There are two potential problems when using the contemporaneous values ygit and pgit: i)
reverse causality due to the potential simultaneity between the incentives and the decision to
commit a crime (for example, crime congestion might lower the likelihood of apprehension)
and ii) due to the yearly aggregation criminals’ expectations might be based on future crimes,
introducing additional measurement error.
Little is known about how criminals form their economic expectations about the crimi-
nal incentives but a few articles have developed theories that we use to set up our empirical
methodology. As mentioned in Lochner (2007) “Theories developed in Sah (1991) and Lochner
(2004) stress that the probability of arrest is learned from others or through one’s own experi-
ences...Beliefs about the probability of arrest are likely to depend on an individuals own (past)
criminal behavior and arrest outcomes, the criminal and arrest outcomes of others around him,
and more general signals that may come from local arrest rates or neighborhood conditions.”
In other words, current expectations are a function of past realizations. We assume that
past realizations influence current realizations only through the expectations of criminals, once
we account for all state-offense-specific and county-year-specific influences. Individuals who
have been operating in the criminal markets in the past or who know someone who has been
operating in the past, use past experience to form expectations about the future. Moreover,
if expectations are rational then average realizations at time t should be equal to the ex-ante
expectations (t-1 ), and these should be a function of all the information available to criminals
up until time t-1, including previous realizations.
In modeling the expectations we use a two step procedure, where in the first stage we
obtain p̂git and ŷgit and in the second step these measures are used in Equation 5 to determine
whether males and females have different responses to the predicted values of incentives. These
equations are an instrumental variable 2SLS regression, where ygi,t−1 and pgi,t−1 are used as
instruments for ygit and pgit.
7
7Given that the first stage equation is a dynamic specification, it implies that the first stage coefficient αg
will suffer from a downward bias (Nickell, 1981). This implies that the estimated α̂g will be smaller than the
true αg, if αg > 0. Therefore, the first stage F-statistic will be lower than the “true” one and the instrument
will be stronger than we can observe. In addition, the identified effects in the second stage will be smaller than
what we observe. This bias is alleviated by the length of the panel, which is 20 years in our case. Nonetheless,
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Measurement error. Illegal earnings and probability of arrest are likely to be impacted
differently by a measurement error. The probability of arrest suffers less from measurement
error because we have precise information on those who get arrested. For illegal earnings,
measurement error after averaging might come from victim reports or law-enforcement policies
thus biasing our results towards zero. This would be an issue in our IV specifications if such
measurement error was correlated across years. Given the small likelihood of victimization
it is unlikely for a victim to report crimes in consecutive years and so the serial correlation
would have to come from group behaviour (i.e. biased reporting by gender, race, typology of
crime, etc.). Adding the corresponding fixed effects can flexibly account for these sources of
measurement error. As for police policies, in our empirical specification we include interacted
year-county fixed effects which can account for year to year changes in recording crimes by the
police. Moreover, measurement error might be an issue if i) there is a systematic gender bias
in collecting data on illegal earnings (we believe this to be implausible, especially for property
crimes where the victims have an incentive to report the crime and the value of the stolen
items) and ii) males and females select into different crimes that have different measurement
error. While this could easily be going on, since we have a log-specification and we control
for the typology of crimes committed, any systematic bias or differential measurement error
in reporting would be absorbed by the fixed effects.
3.2.3 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In order to determine the importance of the criminal incentives, like earnings y and proba-
bility of arrest p, on the gender crime gap, we use a partial Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition,
limited to y and p. We are interested in how much of the difference between male crime
participation, measured by cmit, and female crime participation, cfit, can be explained by
incentives (endowments in the jargon of the decomposition) and responsiveness (the betas).
To do this we define two counterfactuals, using the estimates obtained from Equation 5.
In the first counterfactual we will assign to females the male incentives, thereby changing
females’ “endowment”. In this way we want to observe how the difference in earnings and
arrest probability between the two genders contributes to the observed participation gap.
Defining ĉfit = ymitβ̂
1
f + pfitβ̂
2
f + Z
′
fitγ̂f to be the predicted female crime rate based on Eq.
5, we derive the counterfactual in the following way:
cmfit = ymitβ̂
1
f + pmitβ̂
2
f + Z
′
fitγ̂f = ĉfit + (ymit − yfit)β̂1f + (pmit − pfit)β̂2f . (6)
In other words, substituting the female endowments, yfit and pfit, with the male ones,
ymit and pmit, generates the counterfactual female crime rate. The new crime rate c
m
fit can be
interpreted as the crime rate in a world where females have the same earning and the same
probability of arrest as males. Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the
counterfactual crime rate, the male crime rate and the female one. In this figure we want to
observe how the distance between ĉmit and c
m
fit compares to the initial distance between ĉmit
and ĉfit. The difference in distances would show how much of the initial gap arises due to
differences in the possible earnings and arrest probabilities for each gender.
To determine how much of the observed gap is due to differences in the estimated responses
to earnings and arrest (the βs), we define the second counterfactual:
cβfit = ĉfit + (β̂
1
m − β̂1f )(yfit − yf ) + (β̂2m − β̂2f )(pfit − pf ) (7)
we comment on its effect in results in Section 4.
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This counterfactual corresponds to a world where females have the same elasticities as
males have, but keep their initial endowments. In this expression we adjust the female coef-
ficients βf in the estimation of the predicted female crime rate, by replacing them with their
male counterparts.8
To determine how much of the observed gap arises due to differences in the estimated
elasticities, we again plot the cumulative distribution functions in Figure 5. In the second
panel of the figure we again compare the difference between the new predicted female crime
rate cβfit and the male crime rate ĉmit to the actual gap in crime participation, between ĉmit
and ĉfit. This comparison shows how much of the crime participation gap is due to differences
in the way males and females respond to incentives.
4 Results
4.1 Differences in incentives
In Table 3 we present results for the illegal earnings gap. As explained in Section 2.2, shoplift-
ing is a special crime, therefore we exclude it from the first four columns and include it in
the last column as a robustness check. In column 1 we show females have 13 percent lower
criminal earnings. In the next three columns we add progressively more fixed effects, but the
gap remains stable at around 13 percent. Our preferred specification is that of column 4 with
all the controls and the fixed effects. By adding these fixed effects we want to account for
jurisdiction specific policing responses, for the sanction for a specific crime in each state, as
well as availability of criminal targets related to the business cycle. In column 5 we select
a subsample of daylight crimes committed between 8 AM and 7 PM. We do this robustness
check in order to alleviate concerns on reporting bias: it might be the case that if the female
perpetrators were not well observed they would be reported as male. During daylight he gap
is still negative and is even larger in magnitude. Females earn 15 percent less than males in
daylight crimes, which is similar to the previous estimates and shows that reporting biases
are unlikely to drive the gap.
Finally, in column 6 of Table 3 we include shoplifting as a robustness checks. We find that
the gap diminishes to 7 percent, meaning that the earnings gap in shoplifting is in favor of
females and is significant enough to attenuate the estimates on the earnings gap in all crimes.
In Table 4 we present the results for the arrest gap. In the first column the arrest gap
is negative at 5 percent, meaning that females are 5 percent less likely to be arrested than
males. However, the gap increases to 9 percent as we control for more heterogeneity by adding
different fixed effects. As before, our preferred estimate is from the specification in column 4,
where we observe an arrest gap of 9 percent. The arrest gap increases in daylight crimes to 15
percent, suggesting a reporting bias where females could have been reported as males. The
increase in the relative number of new “females” would drive down the relative probability of
arrest and result in a smaller gap as in the previous columns, conditional on there being no
other significant differences in crime participation within the 24 hours of the day. We assume
that in the daylight hours most perpetrators are clearly observed.
In the last column of Table 4 we show that shoplifting drives the estimates on the average
gap in arrest rates, which now decreases to 0 percent. This reveals that shoplifting is a crime
in which females face a higher likelihood of arrest than males.
8Subtracting the minimum values yf and pf normalizes the intercepts and rotates the counterfactual around
its minimum value (rather than around the initial intercept, where y = 0 and p = 0).
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Overall, conditional on crime participation we find that females earn 7 to 13 percent less
than males and face a lower likelihood of being arrested.
4.2 Differences in Responsiveness
Table 5 shows our estimates for the first stage and reduced form using alternative specifications
with and without county fixed effects and their interaction with year fixed effects, and with
and without state fixed effects and their interaction with typology of offense fixed effects.
In the top panel we observe that the lag of the (log) probability of arrest and the lag of
(log) illegal earnings are good predictors of, respectively, the (log) probability of arrest and
(log) illegal earnings. The F-statistics is, in all the specifications, well above conventional
levels at 187 for Males in our preferred specification and 94 for Females. In the bottom panel
of Table 5 it is reassuring that the coefficients have the right sign. An increase in the illegal
earnings is associated with an increase in the crime rate and an increase in the probability of
arrest is associated with a decrease in the crime rates.
In Table 6 we present the 2SLS estimates on the gender-specific response elasticities. In
each additional column we control for more sources of heterogeneity such as police presence,
sentence length and business cycle effects by adding fixed effects and their interactions. We
show in the odd columns with the header “Male” that a 100 percent increase in the expected
illegal earnings would lead to a 36 percent higher participation of males in crime. Similarly,
the elasticity of expected criminal earnings for females in our preferred specification in the last
column is 23 percent. On average, we observe that females have always a significantly lower
elasticity of illegal earnings than males. As mentioned in Section 3.1, this could be driven by
females being more risk averse than males.9
With respect to the probability of arrest, we find that for both males and females, the
elasticity is between -14 and -22 percent. In our preferred specification in columns 7 and 8,
the male and female coefficients are not significantly different and are around -14 percent.
Males and females respond similarly to an increase in the probability of arrest.
Correcting for the Nickell bias,10, we find somewhat larger first stage coefficients and we
end up with an elasticity of earnings for males of around 0.26 and an elasticity of earnings for
females around 0.15. The elasticities of arrest decrease to 13 percent. All elasticities remain
significant at conventional levels.
With respect to the control variables, we find that being black is associated with an
increase in the crime rate. Offenders aged from 15-24 contribute more to the crime rate
than offenders aged 25-34 compared to the excluded category 35-44. The crime rate is also
associated with the average wage and employment rate in all specifications, even though the
coefficients change in the different specifications that we use. These results seem to be highly
dependent on the inclusion of the fixed effects. In our preferred specification in column 7
and 8, an increase in the wage is associated with an increase in the crime rate, whereas the
employment rate is negatively associated with the crime rate.
To sum up, we find that both males and females respond to incentives. They are both
more responsive to changes in the illegal earnings and remain equally deterred by increases in
the probability of arrest. Males tend to respond more than females.
9For an overview of experimental evidence that women appear to be more risk averse than men see Eckel
& Grossman (2008).
10We do that by applying the equation (19) from Nickell (1981) which approximates the bias to the estimated
coefficient. Then we take the ratio between the reduced form coefficient and the corrected first stage to arrive
at the bias corrected coefficients, which are reported in Table 8.
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In Table 7, we show OLS estimates. We find that the estimates of the elasticities are
smaller, which is consistent with the simultaneity issues outlined before.
Robustness Checks. In Table 8 we perform robustness checks with the aim to see whether
our estimates depend on the particular specification we used. First of all, in the first set
of column we report our estimates from Table 6 corrected for the Nickell bias, which were
commented above. Second, to be sure that our results are not biased by the smaller dimension
of the cohorts in the sample, we cut the sample at the median population and take the cohorts
with larger populations. Almost all elasticities increase in magnitude. In larger cohorts, an
increase in the earnings of 100 percent would lead to an increase in participation by 42 percent
for males and 35 percent for females, which is larger than the average response. At the same
time, the response to the probability of arrest increases for males to -18 percent and slightly
decreases to -12 percent for females. Overall, when we use larger cohorts criminals seem to
be more responsive to incentives.
In the last panel of Table 8 we add shoplifting to the sample. We find larger earnings
elasticities and smaller arrest elasticities for both genders. We interpret this as evidence
that shoplifting is a crime that is recorded only when arrest takes place, which biases the
corresponding coefficients towards zero (as already shown in Figure 4).
4.3 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In Figure 5 we present the cumulative density functions for the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
exercise. In Panel (a) we plot the result from equation 6, where we assign to females the male
endowments in terms of earnings and probability of arrest. In Panel (b) we plot the result
from equation 7 where we assign to females the same responsiveness to criminal incentives as
males. In both panels we also plot the predicted cumulative distribution functions of male
and female crime rates. The distance between them exemplifies the participation gaps that
we observe in Section 2.2.
In Panel (a) we show that if females had male endowments, the participation gap would
change by only 8 percent. This is shown by the vicinity between CDF of female crimes and
the counterfactual predicted from equation 6. This is driven by the fact that in Section 4.2 we
show that both gender react similarly to increases in the probability of arrest. The large gap
that remains is partly due to the fact that males have a larger elasticity of illegal income than
females. Here it is important to highlight that one has to take a stand on how to treat the
crime fixed effects. Keeping the female fixed effects we are changing the endowments without
allowing females to switch across crimes.
In Panel (b) we show that if females had the same elasticities as males, then the gap would
be smaller by 56 percent. Given that the two genders respond similarly to increases in the
probability of arrest, this shift is driven by an increase in the elasticity of illegal earnings. This
result implies that differences in risk aversion may go a long way in explaining differences in
criminal attitudes.
Together, differences in endowments and in the elasticities explain 64 percent of the gap.
5 Conclusion
We motivate our research with the fact that little is known about female criminals and about
what may be driving the gender crime gap.
Over the last 50 years there has been an increase in convergence between the roles of males
and females in the legal market, yet there is little evidence on the existence or development
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of gaps in the criminal market.
From a historical perspective, in the 70s concurrently with the women emancipation move-
ments, there have been concerns about an increase in the female participation in crime (Simon,
1976). In the last years the broad social context has been redefining sex roles. Weisheit (1984)
cites a dominant hypothesis that female participation in crime would increase as social sex
roles converge. In line with these theories, in the present study, that focusses on the United
States over the period 1995-2015, we show evidence of the presence of a gender gap in property
crimes that has been shrinking over time.
In our data we observe that in 1995 there was one female criminal for every 3 male ones,
in 2015 this ratio increased to one female for every 2 male criminals.
In order to be able to understand such convergence it is important to determine why
there is a gender gap in the first place. In our paper we unpack the gender gap in criminal
participation in three steps. First, we quantify the observed difference in illegal earnings
and probability of arrest (the so called “criminal incentives” in the Becker’s model of crime)
across gender controlling for several of characteristics and for a number of fixed effects and
their interactions. The mapping of these differences in criminal incentives across gender is
our first contribution. We observe that, ceteris paribus, women earn 13 percent less than men
when committing a crime but they face a 9 percent lower probability of arrest. There are a
host of different explanations for this: ability, choices, effort, search costs as well as underlying
risk aversion.
We also observe that these differences between male and female criminals shrink over time,
which may contribute to a reduction in the participation gap if criminals were responding to
such incentives. And this is what we try to establish in the second part of the study. We
model the participation decision and provide evidence that males and females increase their
criminal engagement when the expected illegal earnings go up and when the probability of
arrest goes down. We also find that females and males respond differently to changes in illegal
earnings, which might signal underlying differences in preferences, for example a higher risk
aversion among women.
Finally, in order to measure how such differences can contribute to the gender gap we
use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Differences in criminal incentives explain 8 percent of
the gender gap, while differences in the elasticities explain a much larger part of the gap, 56
percent. The remaining 36 percent of the gap could be driven by differences in the disutility
of prison (Mastrobuoni & Rivers, n.d.), differences in discount factors (Mastrobuoni & Rivers,
2016), differences in the opportunity cost of crime, due for example, to child rearing, etc.
More elaborate differences may also play a role. Drawing from the economic analysis of
socially constructed identities (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000), it is easy to make the conjecture
that stereotypes can play a role in the participation decision. If crime was a masculine job
then entering females would de-value the masculinity image and may thus be ostracized by
their male counterpart. This would lead to females being less likely to be initiated into crime
than their male counterparts. On the flip side, if females think that crime is non-feminine,
they would be less likely to participate. This role of stereotypes coincides with the findings of
Steffensmeier (1980), who notes that males are less likely to choose a female partner because
they consider females to be less trustworthy and more governed by passions. Gavrilova (2017)
shows that there is a bias against females in criminal group formation. If females do not
get initiated into crime in the same way as males, then maybe they participate less. If this
would be the case, then the illegal market offers a setting in which discrimination is a blessing
in disguise. A blessing, because policy makers and society at large likely prefer lower crime
participation rates. Disentangling the importance of all these mechanisms is left for future
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research, as it requires a great deal of information about criminals that is currently unavailable.
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Figure 1: Fraction of Female Prisoners and Female Workers in the U.S
Notes: On the left axis we plot the fraction of females prisoners while on the right axis we plot the fraction of
women in the labour force in the US over the period 1930-2009. Sources: National Archive of Criminal
Justice Data. Online at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ ACJD; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 2011, Law Enforcement, Courts and Prisons.
Figure 2: Differences between Males and Females
Notes: In this graph we plot the evolution of criminal participation, arrest and illegal earnings of the female
to males ratio over the period 1995-2015. On the left axis we plot illegal earnings and arrest while on the
right axis we plot the fraction of female criminals.
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TFigure 3: Gender Participation Gap in Crime and Incentives
Panel (a) Panel (b)
Panel (c) Panel (d)
Notes: The Y-axis denotes the ratio of female to male criminals. Values above 1 denote crimes with a
higer female than male participation. Values below 1 indicate crimes with a higher male participation. The
interpretation on the X-axis is similar. Circles are proportional to the number of females who commit each
crime. Figures on the left of the panel include shoplifting while those on the right do not. The size of the
circle is proportional to the fraction of females in each crime.
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Figure 4: Density of Illegal Earnings and Arrest for Males and Females
Panel (a) Panel (b)
Panel (c) Panel (d)
Notes: Here we plot the kernel density of log of illegal earnings and arrests for males and females. Figures on
the left of the panel include shoplifting while those on the right do not.
Figure 5: Crime Gaps in the Counterfactual Scenarios
Panel (a) Panel (b)
Notes: In panel (a) we present the male, female and female counterfactual (with the male endowments)
cumulative density function of crime rates using estimates from the IV setup. The females counterfactual CDF
reduces the gap between the two CDFs. In panel (b) we present the male, female and female counterfactual
scenario (with the male coefficients) cumulative density function of crime rates using estimates from the IV
setup. The females counterfactual CDF reduces the gap between the two CDFs.
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Table 1: Crime Codes
UCR Code Description Subsummed into
category*
120 Robbery
210 Extortion/Blackmail Bribery and Extortion
220 Burglary
231 Pocket-picking
232 Purse-snatching
233 Shoplifting
234 Theft from Building
235 Theft from Coin-Operated Machine
236 Theft from Motor Vehicle
237 Parts
238 All Other Larceny
240 Motor Vehicle Theft
250 Counterfeiting/Forgery
261 Swindle Fraud
262 Credit Card ATM Fraud Fraud
263 Impersonation Fraud
264 Welfare Fraud Fraud
265 Wire Fraud Fraud
270 Embezzlement
280 Stolen Property Offenses
510 Bribery Bribery and Extorsion
*We sum over 261 Swindle, 262 Credit Card ATM Fraud, 263 Impersonation, 264 Welfare Fraud, 265 Wire
Fraud and call the new variable “Fraud”. We sum over 210 Extortion/Blackmail and 510 Bribery and call
them “Bribery and Extorsion”
19
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Synthetic Panel (1995-2015)
Males Females
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crime variables:
Number of crimes 38.99 88.23 2 5359 20.12 25.75 2 473
Crime rates (x 100,000) 713.22 1120.99 0.922 55445.55 331.11 532.74 0.869 26562.5
Illegal Earnings 1928.97 5635.30 0.4 1434448 1724.91 4566.78 0.4 434066.50
Prob. of arrest 0.36 0.20 0.01 0.99 0.35 0.19 0.01 0.98
Demographic variables:
Age 15 - 24 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Age 25 - 34 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Age 35 - 44 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Black 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
White 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Population 11858.18 18314.76 6 265977 13847.97 18697.15 45 244929
Wage and salary income 21645.77 14615.84 940 83930.83 14825.88 8340.59 1392.86 37647.86
Employment rate 0.67 0.18 0 1 0.64 0.11 0.25 1
Crime type indicator variables:
Embezzlement 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Fraud 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Counterfeiting 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1
Bribery and extorsion 0.00 0.01 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Pocket-picking 0.00 0.04 0 1 0.00 0.04 0 1
Purse-snatching 0.00 0.05 0 1 0.00 0.03 0 1
Theft from building 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Theft from coin operated machine 0.00 0.03 0 1 0.00 0.01 0 1
Theft from or of motor-vehicle and its parts 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1
Parts 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.00 0.06 0 1
All other larceny 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Motor vehicle theft 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Burglary 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
Robbery 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Stolen property offenses 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1
Observations 150,782 90,394
Shoplifting 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
Observations with Shoplifting 177,644 114,281
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Table 3: Differences in Illegal Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Illegal Earnings
Female -0.133*** -0.147*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.152*** -0.0730***
(0.0160) (0.0138) (0.0108) (0.00979) -0.0115 (0.0102)
Black 0.122*** 0.0343 0.00743 -0.00662 -0.0380** 0.0854***
(0.0296) (0.0375) (0.0208) (0.0174) -0.0183 (0.0153)
Age 15 - 24 -0.0304 -0.00282 -0.136*** -0.125*** -0.158*** -0.0791**
(0.0562) (0.0340) (0.0331) (0.0290) -0.0349 (0.0310)
Age 25 - 34 0.00994 0.00703 -0.0132 -0.0105 -0.0236** 0.0241**
(0.0154) (0.0127) (0.00967) (0.00908) -0.0116 (0.00976)
Log Wage and salary income 0.428*** 0.358*** 0.249*** 0.239*** 0.199*** 0.187***
(0.0564) (0.0404) (0.0355) (0.0325) -0.0365 (0.0340)
Employment rate -0.920*** -0.550*** -0.457*** -0.370*** -0.201* -0.0139
(0.222) (0.147) (0.116) (0.112) -0.121 (0.129)
Log Population 0.221*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.0967***
(0.0117) (0.0237) (0.0160) (0.00946) -0.0106 (0.00908)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no yes yes yes yes
Offense FE no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no yes yes yes
Sample No shoplifting Daylight and All
no shoplifting
Observations 241,176 241,176 241,176 241,176 166,213 291,925
R-squared 0.103 0.170 0.532 0.559 0.497 0.702
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of illegal earnings. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for
the age group and year 1995 for the year dummies. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Estimates are weighted by the size of the cohort.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Differences in Probability of Arrest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Probability of arrest
Female -0.0532** -0.100*** -0.0894*** -0.0909*** -0.0385*** 0.00169
(0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.00847)
Black -0.0574 -0.0274 -0.0255 -0.0336 0.0142 -0.0681***
(0.0488) (0.0275) (0.0226) (0.0204) (0.0234) (0.0170)
Age 15 - 24 0.636*** 0.384*** 0.293*** 0.284*** 0.254*** 0.233***
(0.0944) (0.0826) (0.0414) (0.0386) (0.0415) (0.0289)
Age 25 - 34 -0.00928 -0.0434* -0.0635*** -0.0616*** -0.0591*** -0.0692***
(0.0306) (0.0230) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0184)
Log Wage and salary income 0.206** 0.0475 -0.0204 -0.0135 -0.0369 0.0127
(0.102) (0.0762) (0.0468) (0.0448) (0.0482) (0.0381)
Employment rate 0.648* 0.592*** 0.653*** 0.578*** 0.573*** 0.369**
(0.364) (0.207) (0.174) (0.165) (0.177) (0.143)
Log Population -0.0527*** -0.0229 -0.0338** -0.0258* -0.0124 -0.0123
(0.0201) (0.0218) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0173) (0.0113)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no yes yes yes yes
Offense FE no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no yes yes yes
Sample No shoplifting Daylight and All
no shoplifting
Observations 241,176 241,176 241,176 241,176 166,213 291,925
R-squared 0.076 0.336 0.558 0.605 0.566 0.706
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of the probability of arrest. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35
and 44 for the age group and year 1995 for the year dummies. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Estimates are weighted by the size of
the cohort. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: First Stage and Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Panel A: First stage
Log Illegal Earnings
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.267*** 0.194*** 0.163*** 0.119*** 0.142*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.0866***
(0.0178) (0.0105) (0.00994) (0.00789) (0.00669) (0.00702) (0.00598) (0.00629)
Log Lag Prob. of arrest -0.0558*** -0.121*** -0.0325*** -0.0345*** -0.0381*** -0.0353*** -0.0270*** -0.0347***
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.00910) (0.00981) (0.00814) (0.00965) (0.00735) (0.00952)
Log Probability of arrest
Log Lag Prob. of arrest 0.498*** 0.455*** 0.314*** 0.272*** 0.291*** 0.257*** 0.242*** 0.208***
(0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.00920) (0.00942) (0.00914) (0.0100)
Log Lag Illegal Earnings -0.00249 -0.0112*** -0.000835 -0.000578 -0.00192 -0.00163 -0.000362 -0.00182
(0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00148) (0.00183) (0.00145) (0.00179) (0.00136) (0.00172)
First stage F-stat 108.7 163.1 133.2 113.2 226.7 129.1 186.9 93.94
Panel B: Reduced form
Log Crime rates
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.000485 -0.0336*** 0.0518*** 0.0308*** 0.0513*** 0.0304*** 0.0417*** 0.0204***
(0.00719) (0.00694) (0.00334) (0.00320) (0.00352) (0.00336) (0.00257) (0.00250)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.0854*** -0.0513* -0.0777*** -0.0693*** -0.0628*** -0.0546*** -0.0445*** -0.0366***
(0.0240) (0.0274) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.00969) (0.00885)
Controls
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no no no no yes yes
Test of equality between males and females (p-value)
Log Illegal earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Probability of arrest 0.017 0.265 0.338 0.354
Observations 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394
Notes: The dependent variable is on top of the estimates column. Control variables include race (black), age groups (age 15-24 and age 25-34 ), log wage and
salary income, and employment rate. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. In the reduced form we test whether males and females have
coefficients on the variables of interest that are significantly different from zero. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Crime rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Illegal Earnings 0.000222 -0.182*** 0.317*** 0.259*** 0.359*** 0.266*** 0.361*** 0.233***
(0.0271) (0.0379) (0.0261) (0.0295) (0.0252) (0.0321) (0.0246) (0.0325)
Log Prob. of arrest -0.171*** -0.161*** -0.214*** -0.222*** -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.143*** -0.137***
(0.0473) (0.0611) (0.0324) (0.0382) (0.0354) (0.0425) (0.0380) (0.0438)
Black 1.385*** 0.670*** 1.412*** 1.035*** 1.383*** 1.001*** 1.367*** 0.970***
(0.0684) (0.0468) (0.0454) (0.0397) (0.0465) (0.0388) (0.0454) (0.0381)
Age 15 - 24 0.215 -0.404** 1.085*** 0.897*** 1.117*** 0.950*** 1.144*** 0.971***
(0.135) (0.166) (0.0597) (0.0804) (0.0697) (0.0812) (0.0719) (0.0813)
Age 25 - 34 0.214*** 0.329*** 0.491*** 0.462*** 0.513*** 0.484*** 0.530*** 0.500***
(0.0400) (0.0257) (0.0192) (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0167) (0.0192) (0.0168)
Log Wage and salary income -0.967*** -0.602*** 0.175** 0.639*** 0.207*** 0.727*** 0.225*** 0.751***
(0.151) (0.180) (0.0686) (0.122) (0.0580) (0.114) (0.0591) (0.114)
Employment rate 3.571*** 0.0580 -0.0308 -1.944*** -0.204 -2.303*** -0.260 -2.372***
(0.581) (0.579) (0.345) (0.465) (0.327) (0.433) (0.328) (0.430)
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no no no no yes yes
Test of equality between men and women (p-value):
Log Earnings 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.000
Log Prob. of arrest 0.837 0.669 0.821 0.877
Observations 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394
R-squared 0.483 0.366 0.656 0.665 0.688 0.709 0.720 0.756
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use four different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females.
Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and
year 1995 for the year dummies. We test whether males and females have coefficients on the variables of interest that are significantly different from zero.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Crime rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Illegal Earnings 0.0193*** -0.00799 0.0752*** 0.0599*** 0.0732*** 0.0592*** 0.0646*** 0.0501***
(0.00733) (0.00728) (0.00341) (0.00335) (0.00344) (0.00344) (0.00259) (0.00257)
Log Prob. of arrest -0.122*** -0.0984*** -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.102*** -0.115*** -0.0869*** -0.100***
(0.0242) (0.0275) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0105) (0.00962)
Black 1.379*** 0.680*** 1.364*** 0.984*** 1.334*** 0.949*** 1.311*** 0.922***
(0.0686) (0.0480) (0.0445) (0.0365) (0.0443) (0.0355) (0.0437) (0.0346)
Age 15 - 24 0.188 -0.435** 1.018*** 0.840*** 1.059*** 0.896*** 1.089*** 0.933***
(0.140) (0.180) (0.0578) (0.0788) (0.0674) (0.0791) (0.0700) (0.0802)
Age 25 - 34 0.213*** 0.325*** 0.489*** 0.464*** 0.511*** 0.486*** 0.530*** 0.503***
(0.0408) (0.0273) (0.0179) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0178) (0.0167)
Log Wage and salary income -0.980*** -0.719*** 0.196*** 0.644*** 0.234*** 0.734*** 0.256*** 0.767***
(0.156) (0.193) (0.0657) (0.120) (0.0541) (0.111) (0.0557) (0.111)
Employment rate 3.543*** 0.382 -0.0394 -1.944*** -0.169 -2.314*** -0.239 -2.407***
(0.587) (0.605) (0.339) (0.460) (0.316) (0.422) (0.319) (0.421)
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no no no no yes yes
Test of equality between men and women (p-value):
Log Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Prob. of arrest 0.137 0.175 0.193 0.161
Observations 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394 150,782 90,394
R-squared 0.483 0.402 0.706 0.711 0.747 0.752 0.781 0.789
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use four different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females.
Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and
year 1995 for the year dummies. We test whether males and females have coefficients on the variables of interest that are significantly different from zero.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Robustness: Other Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Crime rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Illegal Earnings 0.261*** 0.153*** 0.424*** 0.351*** 0.385*** 0.327***
(0.0246) (0.0325) (0.0360) (0.0515) (0.0220) (0.0306)
Log Probability of arrest -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.178*** -0.122** -0.0952*** -0.0367
(0.0380) (0.0438) (0.0510) (0.0526) (0.0334) (0.0369)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 150,782 90,394 75,330 45,121 177.644 114,281
Robustness Check Corrected for Population With Shoplifting
Nickell Bias Larger than the Median
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use three different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females. In
columns 1 and 2 we present estimates corrected for Nickell (1981) bias. In columns 3 and 4 we take a sub-sample of cohorts where the population is larger than
the median. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we present results for the whole sample, including shoplifting. Control variables include race (black), age groups (age
15-24 and age 25-34 ), log wage and salary income, and employment rate. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Standard errors clustered at
the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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